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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF REAL PROPERTY
By JOHN E. BUSH
Associate in the Denver firm of Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard
The Supreme Court of Colorado, during 1958, ruled on a number
of cases in the real property field; the most far reaching concern mineral
law. The cases which are worthy of comment are discussed in this
article and are classified under broad topic headings for organizational
purposes.'
OPTION AGREEMENTS'

The parties to the action in Moddelmog v. Cook ' entered into an
option for the sale of real property. Approximately a month after execution of the option, the buyer notified the seller that the property was
subject to an easement for an irrigation ditch, and demanded the return of the down payment. The option was silent as to the easement.
The seller refused to return the down payment.
The supreme court reversed the decree of the trial court reforming
the option, holding that a contract may only be reformed when there
is a mutual mistake and that in this case there was no evidence of a
mutual mistake. The fact that the buyer knew of the existence of the
ditch before signing the contract, the court said, was no indication that
the buyer intended to vary the terms of the written contract, or to
accept a title subject to encumbrances other than those enumerated
therein.'
FORECLOSURE'

Weber v. Williams' involved foreclosure and quiet title actions. In
1 Some of the opinions herein discussed are not final under Colo. R. Civ. P. 118 (c].The discussion of
such decisions will be limited to a statement of the case, in particular the Radke and Corlett cases.
2The court decided another case which is pertinent to this topic which is here noted. In Rhodes v.
Haberstitch, 326 P.2d 657 (Colo. 1958) the buyer brought an action to recover a down payment made under
an option, on the basis that the agreement was void for lack of mutuality. Directed verdict for the buyer.
The allegation of lack of mutuality was based on a provision which provided that if the sellers were
willing and able to perform and the buyer refused, the deposit would be retained as liquidated damages,
but, if the sellers refused to perform and the buyer was willing, the deposit would be returned. The buyer
contended that under this provision he was bound and the sellers were not; therefore, there was lack of
mutuality.
The court, reversing the judgment, held, in construing the agreement in its entirety, that the return
of the down payment upon the sellers' refusal or failure was not an exclusive remedy and that sellers could
not make a naked refusal and be relieved from all obligations. Therefore, since this provision constituted
mulual promises, there was good consideration. This case should cause no concern as to the validity of
the standard options since they are usually null and void only if the seller is unable to perform as distinguished from unwilling.
0330 P.2d 1113 (Colo. 1958).
4See also, Erikson v. Whitescarver, 57 Colo. 409, 411, 142 Pac. 413, 414 (1914). These cases are in
conformity with the weight of authority as to the situation where the easement interferes with the intended
use of the property; see, 55 Am. Jur. Vendor and Purchaser § 263 (19461; American Law of Property §
1 .49(b) (1952);Annot.,57 A.L.R. 1441 (1928).
5 Three other 1958 cases primarily concern foreclasure. Although not worthy of comment as to foreclosure,
they are noted here for other points considered. The first is Bishop v. Moore, 323 P.2d 897 (Colo. 1958),
which involved foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. An employee of the principal contractor brought an action
to establish and foreclose a mechanic's lien against the property of the owner for unpaid wages. The trial
court, finding that the work of the employen was not completed and that which had been done was
worthless, denied the lien. The court, in affirming, held that the prime requisite in establishing a valid
mechanic's lien is that an indebtedness exist in favor of the claimant. The court distinguished the case, as
to the subcontractor's rightto a lien, from the problem presented in Jarvis v. State Bank, 22 Colo. 309, 45
Pac. 505 (1896) and Rice v. Rhone, 49 Colo. 41, 111 Pac. 585 (1910) where the contractor defaulted and
the subcontractor's work was of value. These cases also set out the amount which the subcontractor can
claim in the latter situation. In Richie v. Philfebaum, 324 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1958), the court held that payments in principal received by the mortgagee from an obligor of the mortgagor may be applied against
the principal indebtedness as opposed to current installments, at the election of the mortgagee, in absence
of agreement between the parties or direction of the mortgagor. Nolon y. Colorado Mortgage Co., 322
P.2d 98 (Colo. 1958) is a reminder that when a financial institution undertakes to pay out funds, as work
progresses, to the contractor of the borrower, it has a duty to the borrower to determine that the contractor actually performs the work thai the lender pays him for. The case holds that the lender is liable
for any loss suffered by the borrower because of the contractor's failure to perform the work it receives
payment for, at least if the lender is grossly negligent.
2324 P.2d 365 (Colo. 1958).
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the foreclosure action the plaintiffs, Williams and Taber, filed an action
alleging that they were the legal and equitable owners of certain property, and one of the plaintiffs, Taber, sought foreclosure of a deed of
trust which he held against the same property. The usual motion under
Rule 4 was filed for publication of service which stated that the defendants' address was unknown. The foreclosure action culminated in
sheriff's deed issuing to Taber. Presumably, Taber conveyed part of the
property to Williams.
Approximately a year and a half later, the same plaintiffs brought
a quiet title action against the same defendants. Again, their attorney
signed and verified a motion for an order for service by publication
using the usual language under Rule 4 and stating that the last known
address was the Colorado address given in the deed of trust. Several
years later the defendants filed a motion in both actions to have the
decrees vacated. The plaintiff, Williams, testified at the hearing on the
motions that at all times subsequent to a certain date, which date was
prior to the bringing of the foreclosure action, he knew the address of
the defendant which was in Chicago and that his attorney at no time
questioned him about the address of the defendants. The supreme
court reversed the trial court and remanded with instructions to vacate
the foreclosure and quiet title decrees and to grant the defendant a
reasonable time to answer, holding that one may not be deprived of his
property except by due process of law. Due process under applicable
rules requires notice by actual or substituted service of process. Notice
to the plaintiffs is notice to their attorney, and the failure to disclose the
known address to the court was gross fraud on the court. Therefore, the
judgment is void and subject to collateral or direct attack at any time.
In so holding, the court quoted from a Colorado case' as follows:
"a judgment rendered without service . . . is . . . void, and that all
sales, or other proceedings had thereunder, as to all persons, irrespective
"'
of notice or bona fides, are . . . absolute nullities ..
Weller v; Bank of Vernal' involved a foreclosure action against property owned by a person who had since died. The mortgagee filed a claim
in the estate based on the note. After letters had issued in the mortgagor's estate, the mortgagee, in a foreclosure action, sought and obtained a deficiency judgment against the estate. The supreme court
vacated the deficiency judgment against the estate, holding that the
county court had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the liability of the
estate for the deficiency."
By way of dictum, Denning v. A. D. Wilson & Co.1 serves as a
warning that the usual charges and costs paid by the borrower in connection with a real estate loan might be considered interest under the
1913 Money Lenders Act."
ADVERSE

POSSESSION

In Fallon v. Davidson" the plaintiff brought an action to determine
the ownership of certain land. He asserted a one-fourth interest as a
7Great West Min. Co. v. Woodmas of Alston Min. Co., 12 Colo. 46, 53-54, 20 Pac. 771, 775 (1888).
AThere was no showing st a m-ritorious defense by the plaintiff nor a discussion of the necessity
of such a showing. This case appears to keep Colorado squarely in line with the minority view that such
a showing is nor a condition precedent to bringing this type of action. Annots., 39 A.L.R. 414 (19251, 118

A.L.R. 1958 (1939k;

' 321 P.2d 216 lColo. 1958).
10The case follows Koon v. Bormettler, 134 Colo. 221, 301 P.2d 713 (1956)
no action has been commenced in another court before letters have issued.
11 326 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1958).
12 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 73-3-1 to 11 11953).
"a320 P.2d 976 (Colo. 1958).
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tenant in common. In 1931, the defendant had received a sheriff's deed
as a result of a sheriff's sale against the plaintiff's co-tenant, owner of
a three-fourths interest. The sheriff's deed purported to convey the
whole interest in the land. The plaintiff's action was commenced more
than eighteen years after the deed issued and defendant took possession
under the deed. The defendant had not recorded his deed until approximately five months before commencement of the action. The court
affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In so doing,-the court
noted that there is a division of authority as to whether a voluntary
conveyance by a co-tenant purportedly conveying the whole estate to a
grantee, who takes possession under the deed, constitutes an ouster."
The court held that the judgment debtor did no act inconsistent
with the rights of the co-tenants in permitting the sheriff's deed to issue;
therefore, there was no ouster." As a result, no adverse possessory right
accrued to the defendant and his possession was possession of all the
co-tenants. The court also held that the seven year statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the deed relied upon as "color of title," has
been recorded," assuming, without deciding, that a sheriff's deed is
color of title. 7
EMINENT DOMAIN"'

In Town of Glendale v. Denver,9 Denver filed a petition to acquire
by condemnation a right-of-way for a sewer line through the streets of
Glendale. The lower court denied Glendale's motion for a temporary
injunction and granted Denver temporary possession. Glendale by
writ of error sought reversal of both orders.' The court held that an
injunction will not lie to enjoin condemnation proceedings for the
reasons that there is no injury to the property because of the filing of
the complaint and that the grounds relied upon for an injunction may
be urged in defense to the action.
Secondly, the court held that Denver can acquire a right-of-way for
its utilities by condemnation without the consent of the municipality
through which the right-of-way passes under the authority of the Colorado Constitution,' which grant cannot be limited by statute."
14 The authorities are apparently unaware of the conflict. See e.g., American Low of Property, § 6.13,
note 8 (1952);Annot.,32 A.L.R.2d1216 (1953).
15 For a good discussion of this case see 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 370 (1958). The writer points out that
the clear weight of authority holds that an involuntary conveyance constitutes an ouster. See also Annots.,
27 A.L.R. 17 (1923f, 32 AL.R.2d 1222 (1953).
6 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-7-8 (1953). contains no such express requirement. The cases cited by the
court were based on a prior statute peculiar to tax deeds. See Col.. Rev. Stat. § 137-11-1 (1953), for the
present statutory provision.
17 There seems to be no doubt that it is in other jurisdictions, see I Am. Jur. Adverse Possession § 199
(1936).
10 The city did not fare as well in People ex rel. Denver v. County Court, 326 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1958)
as it did in the Glendale case. In this case, the County of Arapohoe brought an action to seek a decree
declaring void an ordinance of the City and County of Denver annexing certain property to the City.
Denver attacked the jurisdiction of the Arapahoe County Court. From an adverse ruling, Denver sought relief in an original proceeding under Rule 106. Affirming the trial court, the court held that Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 139-11-6 (1953), which provides that "any person aggrieved by any annexation proceedings had
under this Article may apply . . . (within time limit specified) . . . to the county court in which his land
is situated for . . . relief," means that the proper forum is the county court of which the land was a part
beforeannexation.
10322 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 1958).
2o The court held that an order granting temporary possession is interlocutory and not a final judgment;
and, therefore, it is not reviewoble by writ of error. The proper procedure is under Rule 106. Potashnik v.
Public Service Co., 126 Colo. 98, 247 P.2d 137 (1952).
which
21 Colo. Const. art. XX, § 1. The city was relying on Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-52-2(2) (1953),
provides in part "but no sewerage facilities shall be operated in whole or in part in any other municipality
unless the approval of such other municipality in the territory in which the facilities will be located is
obtained."
22 The court qualified the holding as follows: "the municipality traversed could withhold its consent
'.. " 322 P.2d at 1057.
unless proper, safe and healthful construction methods were followed .
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In Town of Sheridan v. Valley Sanitation District,23 the district
sought to condemn a right-of-way across two public streets in the town
of Sheridan. The town withheld its consent. Again, the court had occasion to construe the same statute. 2'
A construction of the above statute giving the city an absolute veto
power would be irreconcilable with the statutory grant to the district of
the eminent domain power." The legislature merely intended to "recognize the inherent power of a municipality to exercise its police power
reasonably to protect its inhabitants."" The court then went on to
state that the record amply established that Sheridan was not concerned
with the health, welfare or safety of the inhabitants of Sheridan in
withholding its consent but its only desire was to "horse trade" with
the district."
2

CONSTRUCTION OF INTERESTS RESERVED OR CONVEYED "

2

In Radke v. Union Pacific Railroad Company the plaintiff brought
a quiet title suit to remove a cloud from his title, created by a reservation in a deed from the U.P. to the plaintiff's predecessor in the chain of
title, which read as follows:
"Reserving, however, to the said Union Pacific Railroad Company the exclusive right to prospect for coal and other minerals
within and underlying said lands, and to mine for and remove
the same if found, and for this purpose it shall have right-ofway over and across said land and space necessary for the conduct of said business thereon without charge or liability for
damage therefor."
The action was brought some sixty years after the date of the U.P. deed.
The supreme court reversed the decree of the trial court in favor of
the railroad, adopting the view of the eleven page brief filed by amici
curiae. The railroad had been assessed and had paid taxes on the
mineral interest since 1920. The plaintiff had also been assessed and
had paid taxes on the entire value of the land including the minerals.
The plaintiff's tax notice did not reveal that a third party was being
assessed and paying taxes on this mineral interest.
The court held that the railroad, by paying the taxes, was a mere
volunteer, and no equity arose, nor did the payments work an estoppel
23324 P.2d 1038 (Colo. 1958).

24 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-52-2(2) (1953). The court referred to the Glendale case as follows: "We held
that this section, if construed to authorize a veto of a constitutional grant of power to the City and
County of Denver, would be of doubtful validity. We then gave force and effect to the language by limiting
the vetoing power of a municipality to a reasonable exercise thereof consistent with the police powers
25

... at 1041.
324 P.2d
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 89-5-2, 13 (1953.

In defining the police power, the
P.2d 1038, 1042, referring to Colo. Rev. Slot. § 139-52-2(2).
court said, at page 1041, a city "may require reasonable, safe, and healthful construction methods, and can
withhold its consent unless given insurance that injury to users of its streets will not result, or that its own
sewer and water lines and water wells in the municipality will not be destroyed or contaminated."
27 A third attempt was made to attack the power of eminent domain in Greenwood Village v. District
Court, 332 P.2d 210 (Colo. 1958), in which case the city attacked the power of the State Highway Department and Arapahoe County to condemn property within its corporate limits. The city contended that its
consent was required under a different statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 120-13-35(10) (1953). The court held that
this section was only optional and that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 120-3-17 (1953), granted the highway department
ample authority and held that the latter statute does not offend Colo. Const. art. V, § 25 (prohibition
requiring
against special lows). The city contended that that part of Colo. Rev. Slat. § 120-3-17 (1953),
the city to maintain the highway buitt on the condemned property offends Colo. Const. art. X, § 7 (prohibition against legislative imposed tax on city). The court held that the subject port of § 120-3-17 has
been superseded by Colo. Rev. Slat. § 120-13-3 (1953), but, apart from that, a duty imposed by the legislature upon a city is not a tax.
28 See also North Sterling Irrigation Dist. v. Knifton, 320 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1958). In this case the landowner sought to bar the district from asserting a fee simple title to a hundred foot strip of ground conveyed by a predecessor in the landowner's chain of title to the district for an irrigation ditch right-of-way.
The court, in holding that the deed conveyed only an easement, pointed out that the instrument was deover, across
nominated a "Right of Way Deed" and conveyed "a strip of ground for the inlet canal . ..
"
and upon ...
20 11 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 80 (Oct. 27, 1958) (subject to possible rehearing at this writing).
28324
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against the plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff was not guilty of laches
since that doctrine can only be invoked by one in possession against one
out of possession. The court concluded that the interest reserved was
a "license . . . viz, an incorporeal hereditament"" which "cannot be

used after the statutory eighteen year period without the consent of the
landowner.""
In Corlett v. Mark T. Cox III," the plaintiff brought an action to

quiet title to certain land, which in effect was an action to determine
the nature of a reservation by a predecessor in the plaintiff's chain of
title. The reservation read as follows:
"It is however further agreed and distinctly understood that
Carl A. Holcomb hereby reserves six and one-quarter percent
(6 ) of all gas, oil and minerals that may be produced on any
or all the above mentioned land, or in other words reserves
one-half (1/2) of the usual 8 royalty." "

The trial court held that the defendant was the owner in fee simple
of 1/16th of the mineral fee which judgment was affirmed by the supreme court. The plaintiff asserted that the reservation created a perpetual not-participating royalty interest, and that the court should
overrule Simson v. Langhof." Instead, the court chose to follow the
Simson case. In addition, the court characterized the opinion in the
West Virginia case of Toothiman v. Courtney" as a well reasoned case
"decisive of the present inquiry." In that case the grantor reserved "all
the oil rental." The court quoted Toothman:
" 'Though he did not reserve by name the oil in place or any
part of it, his reservation of all the rental or royalty to be derived from it compels the court to hold, by construction of the
instrument, that it vests in him the title to that thing, the beneficial use whereof has been reserved. . . . If there had been no

lease on the land, I would be of the same opinion, for a reservation of all possible benefit of the oil is tantamount to a
reservation of the corpus thereof.' ""
WATER RIGHTS

Means v. Pratt" concerned an action initiated by the petitioner to
change the point of diversion of his adjudicated water right. The trial
court dismissed the petition, which holding was reversed by the supreme
court. The facts clearly showed that the petitioner or his predecessors
had used the decreed water rights continuously for at least forty years.
During this time, the petitioner used three different diversion points.
The trial court's conclusion of abandonment, based on the fact that
the diversion point as specified in the petitioner's adjudication decree
could not possibly be utilized as a diversion point for the land of the
petitioner, was erroneous." The court held that non-use, coupled with
intent not to repossess, constitutes abandoment," and that one does not
30

Id. at 85.

Id. at 87.
Cola. Sup. Ct. #18109 (Dec.. 15, 1958) (subject to possible rehearing at this writing).
33 Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
'4 133 Colo. 208, 293 P.2d 302 (1956).
"562 W. Va. 167, 58 S.E. 915 (1907).
"3 Colo. Sup. Ct. #18109 at 9 (Dec. 15, 1958).
3911 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 87 (Oct. 27, 1958).
3"Corey v. Long, 111 Colo. 146, 138 P.2d 930 (1943).
" Arnold v. Roup, 61 Colo. 316, 157 Pac. 206 (1916).
"
"2
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lose his water right by utilizing a diversion point other than the one
decreed to him."
The trial court's conclusion that the petitioner did not establish
prima facie title because one of the deeds in his chain of title did not
specifically mention the adjudicated water rights, was also incorrect
since appurtenant water rights pass under a deed without specific mention if the facts, as here, clearly show that such was the intention of the
grantor.
Finally, the court held that even if the protestants might be injured'1 by the proposed change in the diversion point, the court has
authority under the statutes to propose conditions to prevent such
possible injury." In fact, it is mandatory for the trial court, if the evidence shows that the change cannot be made without injury, to "find
that such injury cannot be prevented by the imposition of terms and
conditions.""
MINERAL DISCOVERY

The next case, Dallas v. Fitzsimmons" involves an ejectment action
by the plaintiff, who held a mineral lease from the state, against parties
who claimed a valid mineral location on a part of the property covered
by the lease. The lease was obtained subsequent to the location by the
defendants. The defendants staked their claim and posted the required
notice first in accordance with federal law, but, after discovering that the
locations were on state land, they amended their claims. They then
attempted to file their location certificates with the state board which
had already granted the lease to the plaintiffs and therefore refused to
accept the certificates. The assessment work was done within the required time. Geiger counter readings indicated the presence of uranium
on each of the claims, but an assay which showed mineralization was
40 See also Pouchaulou v. Heath, 137 Colo. 462, 326 P.2d 656 (1958).
41

The court held

that

the record

showed

the

respondent's claim of

injury was

without

foundation.

42Col. Rev. Stot. § 147-9-25 (1953).
4" 11 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 87, 90 lOct. 27, 1958). This principle is well settled in Colorado. See,
e.g., Colorado Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 249 P.2d 151 (1952).
4323 P.2d 274 (Colo. 1958).
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made of rock from only one claim. The supreme court upheld the judgment of the lower court in favor of the defendants. In so holding, the
court stated:
"Where as here the assay samples come from at least one of the
claims, and all the claims are contiguous, and where the trial
court could and did conclude from the evidence that the nonassayed claims lie in similar ground, it is not unrealistic to
hold that competent radiometric reactions supported by a chemical assay as to a part of the claims, clearly show the presence
of uranium on the adjacent claimed locations, showing the
same or similar radiometric readings. The latter are then valid
'discoveries'. . . . Such other 'discoveries' however must be
capable of competent radiometric delineation in similar rock
in place or along the same vein or lode.""
The court also held that the location statutes must be liberally
construed in favor of bona fide locations and that the leasing powers
of the state are subject to the implied limitation that it cannot lease
lands in possession under mining laws."e
45 Id. at 279.
4e Mr. Justice Hall dissented on the basis that the evidence showed that the assayed rock came from
only one of the claims, that a geiger counter does not indicate mineralized rock in place or in float or in
wash, and that discovery based on the geiger counter reading, "is to substitute for a proof of a discovery
of mineral in place a mere possibility, probability or conjecture of mineral in place, and thus judicially
legislates that there need not be an actual and proven discovery to have a valid claim." 323 P.2d at 280.
For a good discussion of this case, see 35 DICTA 208 (1958). Also compare the dictum in Smaller v. Leach,
136 Colo. 297, 316 P.2d 1030 (1957), as to discovery of uranium by geiger counter, and see 30 Rocky Mt.
L. Rev. 224 (1958) for a discussion of the Smaller case, and for a fuller discussion of both cases, see
Waldeck, Recent Developments in Mineral Discovery Requirements, 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 33 (1958).

Plan to cttend-

INSTITUTE
on

Defending Criminal Cases
FRIDAY

-

1:00 to 4:30 p.m.

March 13 and 20,1959
FEE: None

PLACE: College of Low
University of Denver

Sponsored by Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education

of
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO SCHOOL OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER SCHOOL OF LAW

